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Abstract
This paper applies theories about the Human Visual System to make Adversarial AI more
effective. To date, Adversarial AI has modeled perceptual distances between clean and
adversarial examples of images using Lp norms. These norms have the benefit of simple
mathematical description and reasonable effectiveness in approximating perceptual dis-
tance. However, in prior decades, other areas of image processing have moved beyond
simpler models like Mean Squared Error (MSE) towards more complex models that bet-
ter approximate the Human Visual System (HVS). We demonstrate a proof of concept of
incorporating HVS models into Adversarial AI.
Keywords: Adversarial AI, Human Visual System, Discrete Cosine Transformation,
Luma, Chroma
1. Introduction
Adversarial AI is a set of techniques to find a small change to an input that nevertheless
changes its classification by a classifier. The initial research that launched the field focused
on images as the input and deep convolutional neural networks (DCNN) as the classifier
(Szegedy et al., 2013).
A key to Adversarial AI is the minimization of the perceptual distance of the changes.
Obviously, an unbounded change would trivially completely replace an image of say a truck
with a horse. The central challenge of Adversarial AI is to change the pixels of an image of
say a truck while minimizing perceptual distance, so that a human would still easily classify
it as an image of a truck but a DCNN would be confused into classifying it as a horse.
The minimization of this change is often measured by Lp norms. An L0 norm counts the
number of pixels changed. An L1 norm sums up the magnitude of the change over all pixels.
An L2 norm is the square root of the sum of the squares of the changes. And the L∞ norm
is the magnitude of the most changed pixel. Carlini and Wagner (2017) created multiple
figures that demonstrate the differences between adversarial images generated using each
of these norms.
In this paper, we explore alternative perceptual distance metrics based on understand-
ings of the human visual system (HVS). The HVS encompasses the biochemical, neurologi-
cal, and psychological models of human vision. HVS is often applied to find more effective
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(a) Perturbations applied to the low fre-
quency area of the sky.
(b) Perturbations applied to the high fre-
quency area of the rocks.
Figure 1: Example of masking in high frequencies. Identical amounts of noise have been
added to both images. The perturbations in the low frequency area of the sky
(left) is more noticeable than the perturbations in the high frequency area of the
rocks (right) (Nadenau et al., 2000, Fig. 2).
methods of image and video compression. In image compression, there has already been a
shift from simpler models like Mean Squared Error (MSE) towards more complex models
that better approximate the HVS (Wang et al., 2002).
We draw on two basic theories about the HVS and find that they lead to more effective
generation of adversarial data in some cases.
The first concept is that the HVS is more sensitive to lower frequency information
(Figure 1). This is the basis for the discrete cosine transform (DCT) methodology of lossy
image compression (Hudson et al., 2017).
The second concept is that the HVS is more sensitive to changes in luma (brightness)
than chroma (hue) (Figure 2). This was discovered by Bedford (1950) during pioneering
work on color television, and downsampled chroma channels continue to exist in standards
today like MPEG and Apple ProRes 422 (Apple, 2018).
Our contribution is as follows. We define our problem as reducing the perceptual dis-
tance of adversarial attacks on images. Our approach is to apply HVS concepts better
target the location and perturbation of adversarial attacks. In practice, this could help an
adversary better hide their adversarial attacks from manual detection.
We combine two approaches into what we call the HVS2 attack. Our first approach is
to only perturb pixels in high frequency zones. We use a simple model of high frequency.
Our second approach is to perturb pixels to retain an approximately constant chroma. We
find that these pixels are in the same ”color palette” as the rest of the image, making them
less detectable.
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(a) A clean color image
of an apple.
(b) Black and white
images retain the luma
but eliminate chroma
information.
(c) An image with
heavy distortion of
chroma.
(d) An image with
chroma unchanged but
luma brought to a con-
stant level.
Figure 2: Example of luma and chroma importance. Retaining luma while eliminating or
distorting chroma information results in an image that is still easily identifiable
as an apple. Adjusting luma to a constant level while leaving chroma unchanged
results in an image that is more difficult to classify (Zeileis et al., 2019).
The HVS2 attack works well in some cases and poorly in others.
2. Background and Related Work
Since its creation, the field of Adversarial AI has acknowledged the role of the HVS. In the
original work of Szegedy et al. (2013) that launched the field of Adversarial AI, the authors
describe adversarial images as ”visually hard to distinguish”.
More recently, Carlini and Wagner (2017) called for work into additional models for
perceptual distance: ”Lp norms are reasonable approximations of human perceptual dis-
tance [...] No distance metric is a perfect measure of human perceptual similarity, and we
pass no judgement on exactly which distance metric is optimal. We believe constructing
and evaluating a good distance metric is an important research question we leave to future
work.”
In the first adversarial attack, several design choices were made. The DCNN to be
attacked was analyzed by an adversary in a ”whitebox” setting, meaning that the attack
had access to internal values of the model not normally accessible to end users. The distance
metric used was L2 norm. The input data type were images, and the specific optimization
to discover the adversarial example was L-BFGS. The perturbations affected specific pixels.
Subsequent attacks have expanded the design space.
Additional optimization methods were applied, including fast gradient sign method
(FGSM) (Goodfellow et al., 2014b), basic iterative method (BIM) (Kurakin et al., 2016),
and projected gradient descent (PGD) (Madry et al., 2017).
The multiple options for norms were demonstrated by Carlini and Wagner (2017).
Warde-Farley and Goodfellow (2016) argue that the L∞ norm is a preferable choice for
distance metric.
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Additional secrecy models were introduced and attacked. If the internal values of the
model are hidden, then a model can be attacked by an enhancement of finite differences
called simultaneous perturbation stochastic approximation (SPSA) (Uesato et al., 2018) and
boundary attack (Brendel et al., 2017). Hiding even the output of the softmax behind a
top-1 hard-labeling function can be attacked (Cheng et al., 2018). Other non-differentiable
layers can be approximated by backward pass differentiable approximation (BPDA) (Atha-
lye et al., 2018).
Input types were expanded to include audio, text, and structured data (Cheng et al.,
2018).
The classifier designs expanded beyond DCNN to include RNN, SVM, and gradient
boosted decision trees (Papernot et al., 2016b).
A series of defenses have been proposed, including defensive distillation (Papernot and
McDaniel, 2016). Nearly all have been defeated except the original approach proposed:
adversarial retraining (Uesato et al., 2018) and an optimization, logit pairing (Kannan
et al., 2018).
Finally, the attacks have moved beyond pixel-perfect attacks into the physical world
(Kurakin et al., 2016; Eykholt et al., 2017; Tencent, 2019).
The term adversarial is also used in the field of generative adversarial nets (GANs)
(Goodfellow et al., 2014a). The term adversarial is used identically in both GANs and
Adversarial AI. In both fields, a generator attempts to create adversarial examples that
fool a discriminator. In a GAN, the generator and discriminator are two separate deep
neural networks (DNN). By comparison, in Adversarial AI the discriminator is an existing
classifier and the generator is a hijacked version of the classifier itself, rather than a separate
DNN. If an analogy for GANs is a counterfeiter and a cop competing with each other, the
analogy for Adversarial AI is that the cop is brainwashed into using its police skills to create
counterfeits.
3. The HVS2 Attack
We chose the generic DCNN architecture specified in the Keras documentation for it small
computational complexity. We ran our attack on 100 images from CIFAR10 (Krizhevsky
et al.). We used ourselves as the human subjects to qualitatively measure perceptual dis-
tance.
We based our attacks on the FGSM method for its low computational requirements. For
ease of implementation, we implemented FGSM ourselves rather than modify the reference
implementation in cleverhans (Papernot et al., 2016a).
Our HSV2 attack combines hiding perturbations in high frequency areas and constant
chroma.
For hiding perturbations in high frequency areas, we built our own simple measure of
high frequency. For each pixel’s color channel, we calculated two means: the mean of the
above and below pixel’s color channels, and the mean of the left and right color channels.
We ignored pixels on the edges and corners.
With the vertical mean and horizontal mean in hand, we calculated the absolute value
of the pixel channel’s deviation from each of these means. Then we took the min of those
two deviations. This is our approximation of frequency for each color channel per pixel.
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Layer Type Hyperparameters
Convolution + Relu 32x3x3
Convolution + Relu 32x3x3
Maxpool 2x2
Dropout 0.25
Convolution + Relu 64x3x3
Convolution + Relu 64x3x3
Maxpool 2x2
Dropout 0.25
Flatten
Dense 512
Dropout 0.5
Dense + Softmax 10
Table 1: Our DCNN architecture.
For each pixel, we took the max of the frequencies of the three color channels. This is
our approximation of frequency for a pixel. We reasoned that even if the channel frequencies
from say red and green were low, a high frequency for the blue channel would still cause
the HVS to perceive high frequency for the pixel.
With an estimate of frequency for each individual pixel, we only allowed FGSM to adjust
pixels that had a higher than a specific threshold. Any pixel with a lower frequency was
not perturbed. We tried several thresholds and found 0.01 to generate reasonable results
for some images.
As described below, our initial hypothesis of constant luma failed to product effective
results but led us to the approach of constant chroma. We approximated constant chroma
by only allowing FGSM to operate on pixels where the sign of the gradients on all three
color channels were either positive or negative. We reason that constant chroma creates
perturbed pixels within the same color palette as the rest of the image, reducing perceptual
distance.
We found that the majority of the FGSM adversarial examples were indistinguishable.
For the handful of FGSM examples that were distinguishable, the HVS2 attack would
sometimes successfully generate better images (less perceptual distance) images. Other
times, it would generate worse images (more perceptual distance). See Figures 3 and 4 for
examples of each.
4. Other approaches that failed
Our initial hypothesis on luma and chroma was to convert the image pixels from RGB
to YUV, an HSV oriented colormap that separate luma (Y) from chroma (U and V). To
implement that hypothesis, we converted the gradients generated by FGSM into YUV space,
then clipped to zero any perturbations to the Y (luma) channel. We used the Tensorflow
implementation (Abadi et al., 2015), which uses the matrices in Equations 1 and 2. To apply
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(a) Original images. (b) FGSM attack. (c) HVS2 attack.
Figure 3: The good results. The clean images in column (a) show ”smooth” low frequency
regions. The FGSM attacked images in column (b) show ”rainbow snow” in
those regions. The HVS2 attacked images in column (c) reduce chroma changes
and hide adversarial pixels in high frequency areas, leading to lower perceptual
distance. Original image size 32x32.
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(a) Original images. (b) FGSM attack. (c) HVS2 attack.
Figure 4: The bad results. The clean images in column (a) don’t have enough high fre-
quency areas to hide adversarial pixels. The HVS2 attacked images in column
(c) attempt to place adversarial pixels in the few low frequency pixels, leading to
large perturbations. Original image size 32x32.
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(a) Original image. (b) FGSM attack. (c) Approximate Con-
stant Luma attack.
Figure 5: Example of results from an approximate constant luma attack. The ”rainbow
snow” texture of Approximate Constant Luma attacked image (c) is worse than
the FGSM attacked image (b). Original image size 32x32.
the YUV perturbations, we would take our RGB image, generate a YUV image, apply the
YUV perturbations, then convert back to RGB.YU
V
 =
 0.299 0.587 0.114−0.14714119 −0.28886916 0.43601035
0.61497538 −0.51496512 −0.10001026
RG
B
 (1)
RG
B
 =
1 0 1.139883031 −0.394642334 −0.58062185
1 2.03206185 0
YU
V
 (2)
Using this approach, FGSM was generally not able to find an adversarial example. We
hypothesize that the conversion between RGB and YUV acts as a hash function, reducing
the overall effect of any perturbation on a DCNN trained on RGB images.
Our second approach was to approximate our constant luma approach by searching for
pixels where one of the three RGB channels was positive and one was negative. Obviously,
this approach ignores clipping as well as the relatively higher luma of green pixels and lower
luma of blue pixels. This attack created colorized textures that created more perceptual
distance. See Figure 5. However, we hypothesized that perhaps the theory of luma and
chroma needed to be revised in the context of Adversarial AI. While changes in chroma
may indeed be less noticeable to the human eye than luma, changing luma but retaining
chroma would generally create perturbations within the same color palette which would be
easier to hide in high frequency areas. The result was the perturbations described in the
previous section.
5. Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we have modified adversarial AI attacks to incorporate HVS theories of
perceptual distance. We have found that simple approaches can be effective at yielding
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images that are less detectable by the human visual system. By design, these approaches
are simple and unoptimized. We believe better results are possible through many directions
for future work.
Many existing models of the HVS can be used in lieu of Lp norms to optimize for a
weighted average of both misclassification and perceptual distance using PGD (Nadenau
et al., 2000). Even the common approach of DCT will likely outperform our simple measure
of frequency (Hudson et al., 2017).
Continuous clipping functions can be used for for adversarial perturbations. Our cur-
rent approach essentially clips away all adversarial perturbation outside of known regions.
Instead, we could allow smaller perturbations in lower frequency areas and larger pertur-
bations in higher frequency areas.
Because people are accustomed to JPEG compression artifacts, it may be possible to
hide perturbations even in low frequency areas of images if boxed in by 8x8 pixel regions
to simulate the artifacts of JPEG compression.
Existing HVS models were mainly focused on quality of image compression. There
may be different HVS models for hiding adversarial perturbations. To promote further
research, new mathematically HVS models focused on hiding adversarial perturbations can
be developed. Initially these models will need to be benchmarked by human subjects, just
like existing HVS models (Sheikh et al., 2006).
DCNNs trained on on HVS-based colorspaces like YUV may be require larger perceptual
distance to generate adversarial perturbations.
Finally, outside the field of Adversarial AI, the relatively importance of luma suggests a
new design for convolutional neural networks, where the luma channel has relatively more
hidden layers and more weights than the chroma channels. In an extreme model, chroma
could be eliminated entirely to train a black and white only DCNN.
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